FYI a great way to share your logs (if you have internet on the machine but no GUI) is to use a pastebin like 0x0.st. E.g. do journalctl | curl -F'file=@-' https://0x0.st and post the link here.

I’d try the kernel version used in 23.11 to see if that fixes it. Add boot.kernelPackages = pkgs.linuxKernel.packages.linux_6_1; to your config (make sure to add it before the closing }) and sudo nixos-rebuild switch . You can also try older versions, like linux_5_19. If it doesn’t fix the problem it might be that the ACPI error is a red herring and the problem is something else entirely, in which case it’d be more difficult to diagnose, and I’d recommend just staying on 23.11 for now and only taking the new packages that you need from 24.05. There’s a great post on how to do this here: https://discourse.nixos.org/t/installing-multiple-packages-from-unstable-channel-in-configuration-nix/19271/2 (probably also in the docs somewhere but I couldn’t find it easily).

telegram is not safe enough, but for some reason it is preferred by drug dealers. The lives of these people literally depend on the messenger.

Most people are technically illiterate. On top of that, most criminals are idiots (otherwise they’d have calculated risk/reward ratio rather than only looking at the reward side of things). The reason it is used by drug dealers is (1) Telegram is convenient, (2) Telegram is not moderated so they accumulate there due to “moderation selection”, (3) Law enforcement didn’t care enough to do anything about that. Now that (3) has changed and (2) is on shaky grounds, I expect a lot of them will move elsewhere.

Signal chats can read messenger developers with basic hack (add one more person in chat and collect messages on disk)

How exactly do you think that would work? To add a new recipient the client needs to explicitly encrypt messages with a key available to that recipient. What command in the Signal protocol would trigger that action without first establishing trust in the recipient? (FYI when adding a new device, there is a key-exchange and verification process, which requires access to some other device with keys already on it).

Tell me how Durov, or someone else get access to my one-to-one crypto chat, if I compile mtproto self from github?

As a separate statement: they can’t (probably).

In context of the discussion: they don’t need to, because secret chats are so inconvenient and fussy that they are seldom used. There is a lot of crime happening in public groups/channels, in “private” groups chats that can not be encrypted, or in 1-on-1’s that are not secret. Telegram has the ability to stop all of that with just some moderation, or turn messages over to the authorities, but they don’t. Which is precisely why Durov is in custody right now. If he actually made a messenger with good, convenient end-to-end encryption, he would be in the same situation with Signal authors, who have perfect deniability since they can’t read anything their users have sent up until this point.

Bullshit.

If you want protect yourself for random network administrator on your network line, of course.

Telegram and Signal both use TLS. They are identically secure from transport-level attacks.

If you want protect from anyone (government for example), of course not.

Of course yes. If you want a more private group chat, or an actually useful 1-on-1 encrypted chat that works across multiple devices, Signal is the only option (out of the two, there are way better alternatives like XMPP and Matrix). For 1 device-on-1 device E2E chats, Signal and Telegram are about the same level of security, except Telegram’s protocol sees less scrutiny from the crypto community.

As telegram. If you think that some drug dealers create public chats with sell drugs, so… you are wrong. All work with darknet. In telegram all of them use only private one-by-one crypto chats.

LOL. I see drug ads on the street all the time. The one time I checked, it pointed to a publicly available Telegram bot.

If Signal was to pull a MITM, it would have been noticeable as it requires active intervention in the protocol (it hasn’t been noticed yet), it would destroy all plausible deniability for them going forward, and it wouldn’t be possible on existing chats (once the key exchange between two parties happens, it’s impossible to do MITM). Telegram can just straight up read your messages, past, present and future, do whatever they want with them, with no way for anyone to check if that happens. It’s two different tiers of communication security.

To quote another commenter,

You clearly have no idea what you’re talking about.

Navalniy and his team openly supported the annexation of Crimea (and destruction of Ukrainian and Crimean Tartar culture).

Not really: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/opinion/how-to-punish-putin.html ; this is just days after the annexation. I’m no fan of Navalny for various reasons (his nationalist views, xenophobic comments and narratives, etc), but he was very much against all Putin’s shenanigans in Ukraine, and vehemently anti-war.

The recently exchanged “dissidents” also showed their true colours by supporting the annexation of currently occupied territories in Ukraine.

What are you on about? Name one of them who supported the war. Most of them were jailed due to their anti-war positions.

Upon further inspection, it’s almost definitely AI. Look at the better-quality original: https://in.pinterest.com/pin/937874691150982659/

In particular, note the nonsensical reflection in the mirror (which is inexplicably placed on the floor?), weird toilet paper roll, and half-unicorn horn half-third ear thing sticking out from the head.

And if you check out that Pinterest account, it’s full of AI-generated crap too.

Which mostly just demonstrates how good the AI has become, to the point where if you scale down the image somewhat, it fools humans and AI detectors alike.